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Abstract: Autonomy in the arts is generally considered an outdated concept, an
atavism that is only relevant to outsiders and to people who have a mere tradi-
tional, if not completely obsolete understanding of the artistic and aesthetic field.
Autonomy in this view has little to do with contemporary discussions about art
and artistic practices. The contemporary relevance of the concept is illustrated
with the existence and the curriculum of the university English department, which
‘has modernist autonomy in its genetic code’, and also with the institution of the
Nobel Prize in Literature, whose winners have been defending aesthetic autonomy
in their ceremony speeches every time. Those examples suggest that autonomy is
more rejected in the academic field than in the practices of, in this case, the world
of literature.
Autonomy in the arts is generally considered an outdated concept, an atavism
that is only relevant to outsiders and to people who have a mere traditional,
if not completely obsolete understanding of the artistic and aesthetic field.
Autonomy in this view has little to do with contemporary discussions about
art and artistic practices. The very first sentence of a recent study about au-
tonomy in literary fiction, Andrew Goldstone’s Fictions of Autonomy (2013)
for example reads: ‘In literary studies, we regard aesthetic autonomy as an
idea whose time has passed.’1
Goldstone starts his book with the observation ‘that the belief that art —
including literature — is a law unto itself, neither governed by nor respon-
sible to extra-aesthetic concerns, has few defenders among scholars today.’2
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This observation implicates those who discuss the relevance of the concept
of autonomy in the arts in a non-historical or non-contextual approach, as
being outside the academic field. As Goldstone puts it: ‘Contextualism is the
professional norm.’3
So, Goldstone discusses autonomy in the arts as merely a historical phe-
nomenon, exclusively bound to modernism. However, even then one could
ask, what the relevance of such a book might be, beginning, as it does, with
this firm negative statement about autonomy. The question presents itself
again at the end. In ‘Epilogue: Autonomy Now’, Goldstone eventually de-
fends a ‘relative autonomy’, avoiding the extreme position of ‘would-be de-
bunkers of all claims to aesthetic autonomy’ as well as the opposing ‘would-be
celebrants of the religion of art’.4 The contemporary relevance of the concept
is illustrated with the existence and the curriculum of the university English
department, which ‘has modernist autonomy in its genetic code’, and also
with the institution of the Nobel Prize in Literature, whose winners have
been defending aesthetic autonomy in their ceremony speeches every time.
Those examples suggest that autonomy is more rejected in the academic field
than in the practices of, in this case, the world of literature.
I. OBSOLETE AND PERSISTENT AUTONOMY
Nevertheless, both fields have shown continuous suspicion towards the con-
temporary relevance of autonomy. In the introduction of Aesthetic Autonomy:
Problems and Perspectives (2004) Liesbeth Korthals Altes presents four rea-
sons for the decay of autonomy in literature. In the first place, literature
treated as merely an aesthetic experience, lost importance in an academic
world that became interested in ‘less closed disciplines’ like ‘sociology, cul-
tural history, philosophy of culture, ethics.’5 Second, a certain democratiza-
tion of literature itself has led to a more pluralistic view on the identity of
the literary work, making it sometimes difficult to know what belongs to lit-
erature and what doesn’t. Third, the traditional difference between what is
seen as literary fiction and what is understood as nonfiction, referring to re-
ality, has become increasingly less evident, in literature as well as in literary
scholarship. And fourth, the so called ethical turn in literature studies, and
deconstructivist criticism on the literary identity of a text have resulted in
even more scepticism towards such a thing as autonomy.6
In the other arts, comparable developments have taken place. To start
with, a long avant-garde tradition in all the arts became ever more critical
about the gap between art and life and between art and society.7 Further,
since the 1970s the border between mass culture and what was traditionally
seen as ‘high art’ has become rather vague. The once stable difference between
art and popular culture has been blurred by new genres and art practices like
comics, slam poetry, web design, pop music, cabaret, fashion and even com-
mercials, often undermining the traditional belief in the autonomy of art. In
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the academic world, most art disciplines were assimilated with, or at least
seriously influenced by Cultural Studies and framed in postmodern theories
that rejected autonomy for many reasons. Not only because the artistic prac-
tices themselves have considerably changed, but also because interdisciplinary
research and the approach of social studies have become ever more important
in the last decades, all in line with the reasons just mentioned for the decay
of autonomy.
In contemporary academic discourse, the concept of autonomy in art is
usually related to modernism, in literature as well as in the other arts, and
since the decline of modernism it has become a historical rather than an
aesthetic phenomenon for most scholars indeed.8 And if the relevance of the
concept of autonomy is not denied for historical reasons, it is rejected with
sociological and political arguments, reducing autonomy, to put it bluntly, to
an expression of the ideology of the ruling class, an argument that most often
goes back to Pierre Bourdieu’s La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement
(1979).9
Yet, the topic of aesthetic autonomy re-emerges again and again, not only
in historical studies of modernism and in epilogues and footnotes in the aca-
demic field, but also in the practices of the arts themselves. Several symposia
and public debates over the last few years discuss the threatened indepen-
dence of the arts in education and in many other practices, like museums,
bookshops, newspaper criticism, new media, due to a growing commercial
culture and a more consumerist attitude towards the arts. These develop-
ments are enhanced by a populist political climate, that is extremely critical
of the pretentions of the arts. In this critical view, the arts are not able
to prove their societal or economic relevance. Although many discussions in
these contexts focus on autonomy as an outdated, modernist concept, several
contributors in the field of the arts consider autonomy as something that is
crucial in the aesthetic discourse of today.10
Instead of repeating the historicity and irrelevance of the autonomy con-
cept it may be interesting to ask, why it keeps reappearing even though it
has been criticized continuously. If we keep in mind Peter Bürger’s analysis
in his classic Theory of the avant-garde (1984), that the avant-garde failed to
abolish autonomy in the arts and that such an abolishment appeared to be
impossible in what he calls ‘late capitalist society’, it may still be worthwhile
to ask ourselves, how to understand the persistent belief in autonomy after
the end of the avant-garde, a belief that has so often been rejected and yet
is still present, and may be not as obsolete as main stream theory in cultural
studies and the humanities suggest.11 In doing so we can better go back to
the emergence of the belief in autonomy of the last few centuries rather than
adding still another explanation about the irrelevance of the concept.
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II. ROMANTIC DISCOURSE
It cannot be denied that the social sense of the autonomy concept is relevant
for the aesthetic field, as has been explained by Bürger as well as by Adorno
and many others.12 Social autonomy is the result of the historical differen-
tiation in which the production of artworks becomes independent from the
context of the church and the aristocracy, accompanied by an emerging art
market and professionalization of the artist. The outcome of this development
is reflected in the discourse of the artist as genius, in which even the public
doesn’t seem to play any significant role anymore. As John Keats wrote in
a letter to Reynolds in 1818: ‘I never wrote one single line of Poetry with
the least Shadow of public thought.’13 And the American romantic painter
Washington Allston said to the autonomous artist: ‘Trust your own genius,
listen to the voice within you, and sooner or later she will make herself un-
derstood not only to you, but she will enable you to translate her language
to the world, and this is which forms the only real merit of the work of art.’14
Art can only reach the world as an expression of the personal genius of the
independent artist.
Although the social concept of autonomy and the aesthetic use of the con-
cept are historically intertwined, we can acknowledge, following Jason Gaiger
in a recent article in the British Journal of Aesthetics, ‘the social and eco-
nomic differentiation of art without accepting the stronger, normative view
that the value of art lies in its independence from any practical purpose.’15
This, however, seems to confirm Goldstone’s statement that contextualism
is the professional norm without understanding that such a sociological ap-
proach isn’t any less ideological. The professional norm is a norm indeed.
In understanding the roots of aesthetic autonomy most historians of ideas
begin with P.O. Kristeller’s analysis of the rise of an aesthetic discourse in
the eighteenth century, whereas philosophers often prefer Kant’s theory of
aesthetic judgement as a starting point.16 Both views represent important
early developments in the Age of Aesthetics. And both views are completely
relevant, Kristeller’s description of the emergence of ‘the modern system of
the arts’ as well as autonomy based on Kant’s judgement of taste as pure
disinterested liking (reinen uninteressierten Wohlgefallen). But they belong
to an aesthetic discourse that, after modernism and with the end of the avant-
garde, has lost some of its relevance, and may be accomplished by another,
related understanding of the radical change that took place at the end of the
eighteenth century.
In discussions about aesthetic autonomy the influence of the romantic
discourse has been seriously underestimated. If we follow Isaiah Berlin’s
dictum, that romanticism is ‘the greatest single shift in the consciousness
of the West that has occurred’, a shift with lasting effects, and if we take
this ‘radical transformation of Western thought and its influences on the
aesthetic discourse up to nowadays’ into account, we may find a more prolific
approach to some of the debates on autonomy that have taken place over
76
Maarten Doorman
the last decades.17 The artistic discourse is still structured by the prominent
role of the imagination, the presupposed genius of the artist and the value of
expression. Since the outbreak of romanticism they can be seen, to use the
words of Goldstone, as the genetic code of the aesthetic field. If we discuss
Western art of today, we discuss romantic art. Romanticism is constitutive
for art practices since two centuries, its influence is everywhere. Romantic
ideas about individuality, creativity, the imagination, the role of the artist,
authenticity, and autonomy are still the basic values in contemporary art.
‘So deeply are they embedded in our attitudes and ways of thinking,’ writes
Honour, ‘that we are rarely aware of them.’18
A century of artistic resistance against those inherent romantic beliefs,
starting with Marcel Duchamp and dada, has only reiterated their presence, as
I hope to have shown in my book De romantische orde (‘The romantic order’).
It is hard to give an interpretation of the work of Jeff Koons, to mention an
example from this book, without understanding the romantic irony in his
oeuvre that brings back the traditional role of the artist, just as it is difficult
to discuss the function of the autobiographical in Dave Eggers’s novel A
Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius (2000) without an understanding
of the same kind of romantic irony. This irony is a distinctive characteristic
of the romantic discourse, seen as the conflict, to quote Friedrich Schlegel,
‘between the absolute and the relative, the simultaneous consciousness of the
impossibility and the necessity of a complete account of the reality.’19 The
basic values of art — expression, imagination and genius — can only exist
as long as romantic irony reconciles the opposition between the transcendent
and the empirical world, between the absolutist pretentions of art and the
relativity of the real, existing artwork. In this approach, the autonomy of the
artistic field is not exclusively related to the historical developments Kristeller
noted, or to the analysis of the disinterestedness of Kant, but also to the
romantic discourse of the values imagination, genius and expression, values
that can only exist with romantic irony. In that sense they are all constitutive
elements for artistic autonomy.
III. THE PROVOKING MONSTROSITY OF ART
If we ask which type of autonomy has been discussed and criticized in art, not
only in the last few decades, but during the whole last century, we may find
that it is in the first place symbolism, and in a broader sense the attitude of
aestheticism that emerged during the nineteenth century. This aestheticism is
opposed to the moral expectations of the bourgeoisie and can be understood
as an effort to create a non-moral world in which beauty is adored and in which
daily life and the problems of society are non-existent. Art and life seem to
exclude each other. As Gustave Flaubert wrote in a letter to his mother
from 1850: ‘You can paint wine, love, women, glory only if you yourself
(. . . ) are not a drunkard, nor a lover, nor a husband, nor a soldier boy.
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Involved in life, we see it badly, suffer or enjoy it too much. The artist, as I
believe, is a monstrosity — something outside nature.’20 And he is not only
a monstrosity outside nature; the moral provocations in this tradition can
be seen as claims to an independent existence that is in principle immune to
any moral or social reproach. Charles Baudelaire’s The Flowers of Evil21 is
probably the most influential manifestation of such an anti-moral attitude.
Baudelaire successfully opposed the so-called bourgeois ideology in a nearly
religious, but at the same time consciously provoking adoration for art and
beauty, as we can read in the last lines of his ‘Hymn to Beauty’: ‘Are you
from heaven or hell, Beauty that we adore? / Who cares? A dreadful, huge,
ingenuous monster, you! / So but your glance, your smile, your foot open a
door / Upon an Infinite I love but never knew. // From Satan or from God?
Who cares? Fierce or serene, / Who cares? Sister to sirens or to seraphim?
/ So but, dark fey, you shed your perfume, rhythm and sheen / To make the
world less hideous and Time less grim.’22
The provocation in those lines, and in the work of other writers like Oscar
Wilde, Edgar Allen Poe, Théophile Gautier and visual artists like Gustave
Moreau or Odilon Redon can be understood in different ways. First, it is a
defence of artistic freedom in holding that the daily common world is senseless,
ridiculous and boring and that the world of art is the realm in which people,
or at least the sensitive artists, find reconciliation. Gautier’s ‘art for art’s
sake’ only accepts the authority of the imagination, which means that art
must be completely free from what society asks for, what morals prescribe
and even what the personal life of the artist demands.
But this call for autonomy and absolute freedom, also, more or less openly
provokes bourgeois morality, and it therefore participates, implicitly, in moral
and societal debates about sexuality, freedom of expression, religion, gender
and the like. So, the belief, or rather the ideology of autonomy was not only
an artistic escape from society, daily routine and the sterility of the bourgeois
world, it also presented another way of life, and in doing so, it has been con-
tributing to debates on moral values as well. Beauty could be a monster. Art
opened the door to a realm that could be hell as well as heaven. Nevertheless,
quite a few defenders of aesthetic autonomy in the nineteenth century would
strongly deny any moral or political relevance in art. Théophile Gautier, for
example, criticizes writers who pretend to humanize the world in the tradition
of Saint Simon and Charles Fourier. Gautier opposed the idea of progress and
is said to have confessed ‘that he would gladly renounce his political rights in
exchange for seeing an authentic painting by Raphael or a beautiful woman
in the nude.’23 In his article ‘Aesthetic Autonomy and Literary Commitment’,
Arnold Heumakers makes two important observations. First, he argues that
even the most famous and ardent defenders of an anti-utilitarian aestheticism
in the nineteenth century were inconsistent, by believing in societal progress,
or, one way or another, got involved with politics. In the second place, he
shows how French aestheticism, which proved to be so influential during the
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nineteenth century (eventually becoming a target for later avant-garde criti-
cism), is grounded in a German romanticism in which the ideal of pure beauty
unavoidably superseded its own limits.
To start with the first observation, Heumakers gives three striking exam-
ples of such inconsistency by the prophets of artistic autonomy. During the
July Monarchy, Théophile Gautier wrote an official poem in honour of the
Martyrs of the Revolution of 1830. And, in the revolutionary year 1848, he
supported the idea of progress and asked the artist to play a role in mod-
ern civilization, completely ignoring his belief in art for art’s sake. Charles
Baudelaire, who mildly criticized Gautier for his opportunism, became in-
volved in politics as well, and wrote about ‘the childish utopia of the school
of art for art’s sake.’24The third example is Oscar Wilde, who echoed Gautier
and Baudelaire in their aestheticism, as in the famous lines of his preface to
The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891): ‘There is no such thing as a moral or an
immoral book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all.’ But at
the same time he defended an implicit form of socialism in various articles.25
And whatever New Critics tried, the successful plays of the 1890s cannot be
understood without the moral and social context of British society that was
discussed implicitly.
We could, therefore, add another reason for the inconsistencies of these
outspoken prophets of artistic autonomy, underlining the second aspect of
the provocation earlier mentioned. The bohemian life, the flirtation with
illegal practices, sexual freedom and homosexuality, in short, their byronian
attitude in which the boundaries between life and art that were at times
hardly visible, go far beyond an aestheticism that has nothing to do with
what was going on in society. On the contrary, the provocations seem to
be related to different forms of emancipation and political controversy. So,
autonomy, in this context, quite often appears to be an ideological myth
rather than a proper description of the artist at work.
IV. GERMAN ROOTS AND THE OMNIPRESENCE OF ART
To understand these inconsistencies we have to go back to the origins of the
l’art pour l’art ideology. The first use of the concept, as far as we know, is
from Benjamin Constant’s visit to Weimar in 1804 with Madame de Staël.
And although the moral provocations of Gautier, Baudelaire and Wilde are
far removed from German romanticism and Kant’s high moral standards,
‘common ground’ for the idea of aesthetic autonomy can be found in Kant’s
definition of taste in his Critique of Judgement, as well as in Karl Philipp
Moritz’s idea that ‘the really beautiful must always be understood in oppo-
sition to the useful, which will never be perfect in itself.’26
The Kantian approach of aesthetic autonomy is manifest in the work of
nearly all leading early German romantics, like Friedrich and August Wil-
helm Schlegel, Novalis, and Schelling. However, their interpretations hardly
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ever excluded the relevance of art (and especially ‘poetry’) for the world of
politics, morals and religion. How is this possible? To start with, the influ-
ence of Friedrich von Schiller’s Letters upon the Aesthetic Education of Man
(1794) was omnipresent in those years. Schiller was convinced that beauty
could elevate people and that what he called aesthetic education could bring
us to a future ideal world.27 This ideal world was not contradictory to the
denial of interest in Kant’s Critique of Judgement; and Schiller’s concept of
Spieltrieb (‘play drive’) created the ability to reconcile autonomous art with
interpretations of moral and political relevance.
Second, most romantics of this period believed, in line with Schiller, that
‘poetry’ (being more or less synonymous to ‘art’ in general) was or had to
be the teacher of ‘humanity’. The anonymous Älteste Systemprogramm des
deutschen Idealismus by Schelling, Hegel or Hölderlin claims this role for
poetry, just like Friedrich Schlegel did a few years later in his Gespräch über
die Poesie (1800). Since romanticism the realm of art became very broad and
non-exclusive. ‘When one sees,’ writes Heumakers, ‘how Schlegel and Novalis
tend to enlarge the field of poetry to include everyone and everything, the
question inevitably arises as to how all this can be considered as partaking of
the autonomy of the aesthetic. If everything is art or poetry, what remains of
the meaning of autonomy? A possible answer is that, in this case, aesthetic
autonomy also enlarges itself to cover all of reality, so that the difference
between art and reality eventually disappears. Indeed, Novalis and Friedrich
Schlegel describe the world as a work of art that continually produces itself.’28
This ‘totalization of art’ may depart from an autonomous position of disin-
terestedness, but the idealistic romantic ambitions show at the same time how
the artist, in withdrawing from the world, paradoxically becomes a prophet
who includes the whole world in his work. ‘The Romantic poets see them-
selves as a reincarnation of the first legislators and creators of civilization,
who, according to ancient tradition, are supposed to have been the first poets
as well.’29 The poet (and in romanticism the poet quite often is synonymous
with ‘artist’) becomes a priest; Novalis calls him omniscient, the voice of the
universe and the representative of the genius of humanity.30
In early romantic poetry and art in England we can recognize a similar
paradox. The work of William Blake for example (like the Songs of Innocence
and of Experience, 1794) departs from a strictly autonomous interpretation of
the imagination but combines often visionary poems (and drawings) with so-
cial criticism. This cannot be so easily related to German roots and Kantian
autonomy, but the paradox of aesthetic autonomy and social commitment is
omnipresent in English romanticism of the years that followed. For instance,
a poet like Shelley is well known for his radical aestheticism. But he also
wrote the political sonnet England in 1819 as a response to the brutal Pe-
terloo Massacre in August 1819.31 Nearly all romantic poets represent both
attitudes, with Byron as the most striking example of this enlarged aesthetic
autonomy, being a provocative defender of autonomy as much as utterly en-
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gaged politically, if we consider, for example, his dramatic role as a liberator
of Greece. Byron is also a clear proponent of the romantic irony that creates
the possibility of this ambivalence. On the one hand, his work rejects any
commitment to a world that he despises, but, at the same time, his work and
deeds breathe engagement. The main character in Child Harold or in Don
Juan escape the world, and both are, at the same time, mocking or criticiz-
ing war, England, bourgeois bigotry etc. Byron’s irony, as Claire Colebrook
puts it, ‘is a worldly rhetorical tool, directed against those who would turn
language into mere cant or mysticism.’32
In the other arts we can find this radical ambivalence as well. The Pre-
Raphaelite Brotherhood may be known for its aestheticism and as forming
a starting point for the Aesthetic Movement later in the century, but most
members were concerned with social problems brought about by the Indus-
trial Revolution. Since not only the French principle of art for art’s sake has
its origins in the romantic discourse, it may become understandable why the
realm of art and the realm of religion, politics and social behaviour eventually
do not exclude each other. In romantic theories of art the universal preten-
tions of poetry (i.e. art) presuppose autonomy, whereas at the same moment
art is understood as the guide of humanity. ‘After all,’ writes Victor Hugo
succinctly, ‘art should be its own goal, teaching, moralizing, civilizing, and
edifying along the way.’33 Though quite less philosophical, this comes close to
Schiller’s influential approach to the role of art. The inconsistencies of writ-
ers like Gautier, Baudelaire, Hugo and Oscar Wilde, and of many romantic
painters during the nineteenth century, have to be understood in the romantic
tradition of totalization and romantic irony. The romantic holism in art (‘po-
etry’), identifying it eventually with the whole world we live in, undermined
its autonomy. But romantic irony, in reconciling the absolute and the relative
(art and world), makes it possible for the romantics to continue their believe
in autonomy. Romantics do not suffer from this kind of inconsistency since
it is characteristic for art as well as life. That makes it understandable how
the belief in aesthetic autonomy can still reappear irrespective of the constant
criticism. And since the discourse of art, up to today, is determined by what I
call elsewhere the romantic order, the paradox of autonomy and commitment
to the world is still relevant in discussing and understanding autonomy in the
arts and in the aesthetic field today.
V. PERSISTENT AUTONOMY
If we agree upon this, we have to see that artistic autonomy has never been
absolute, or better, in its romantic understanding as totalization of art, was
always related to Schiller’s ideal of aesthetic education or the romantic hope
to ‘romanticize the world’, as Novalis calls it in his famous words: ‘The world
must be romanticized. In this way, one finds again its original meaning. Ro-
manticizing is nothing other than a qualitative potentializing. The lower self
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becomes identified with a better self in this operation. (. . . ) Insofar as I
give the common an elevated meaning, the usual a secret perspective, the
known the value of the unknown, the finite an infinite appearance — I thus
romanticize.’34 It is the artist, in the first place, who is responsible for ro-
manticizing the world, and it will be clear that in this view the difference
between imagination and world, art and daily or social life should be super-
seded. The implication of this interpretation means that art, even in its most
escapist manifestations, may always be concerned with the world, including
personal life and the social and political world. Art shows that the world can
be different or at least could be perceived differently.
By romanticising the world, art — as well as the whole world — has
become ambiguous: nothing is anymore what it is, you don’t see what you
see, you don’t hear what you hear and you don’t read what you read. We
don’t have to give up the concept of autonomy to admit that it never leads to
absolute isolation. And we don’t have to deny contextualism either as long as
we see that it is a sociological, or anthropological approach of the romantic
belief that has been constituting art practices for over two centuries. Or
contextualism is a historical approach that is not necessarily contradictory to
the concept of autonomy in the arts.35
Still, the romantic paradox of the belief in, and denial of autonomy is
omnipresent in today’s artistic practices, even though aesthetic autonomy is
mostly considered as obsolete in the academic field, as we have seen. Jason
Gaiger’s observation quoted earlier may be true: we can acknowledge ‘the
social and economic differentiation of art without accepting the stronger,
normative view that the value of art lies in its independence from any practical
purpose.’ But, first, the stronger claim is a reduction of artistic autonomy,
that can be relevant for the world just because of the independence from any
practical purpose, and, secondly, one cannot deny the stronger claim without
consequences for the first. Gregory Jusdanis concludes that ‘the idea that
the art world was free of social and state control opened up a conceptual
forum in society from which artists and intellectuals were able to criticize
a host of oppressive systems from absolutism to capitalism, from sexism to
imperialism. The exercise of intellectual freedom was primarily an aesthetic
enterprise, based on the call that art should be free, originally from the priest,
the prince, and then from the entrepreneur, the police, and the bureaucrat. In
other words, the capacity of intellectuals to evaluate reigning social, cultural,
and political norms was ensured by the dominion originally declared for art.’36
Following Adorno, Jusdanis explains that it is autonomy that makes art
politically relevant. We need counter versions of nature, to examine the dif-
ference between a reality and its imagined reconstructions. Art, however,
‘is political not only in terms of its contents (. . . ) but also in terms of its
autonomous structure.’37 But we can only understand the paradoxical het-
eronomy of art and world, and the persistence of the concept of aesthetic
autonomy, if we relate it to Friedrich Schiller’s influence and to the roman-
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tics, with their so called totalization of the arts, and their irony, because they
structured this critical potential of the whole artistic field. Which means that
we have to be conscious of the persistence of romantic values in the artistic
field.
Many discussions about the importance and relevance of the arts nowadays
are related to the question whether the arts are an autonomous realm or
not. In all fields of education, one asks for justification to teach literature
and other art forms. The political support for subsidizing art institutions
like museums, libraries and concert halls is waning. In the media, many
manifestations of autonomous art have become less important, and it is often
said to be elitist to broadcast art as such. In this context, the discussion
about artistic and aesthetic autonomy is not without importance, since the
common doubt that autonomy still is a relevant factor has weakened the
justification for supporting art institutions, art education, and an open mind
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34. Novalis 1960 ff., 545; Transl. in Richards
2002, 200.
35. Goldstone 2013, 190.
36. Jusdanis 2010, 52-53.
37. Idem, 55.
38. I thank the anonymous peer reviewers of
this article for helpful criticism and quite
a few suggestions.
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